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abstract
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age is both important and insufficient to the study of religion, law, and politics in Latin America. 
While aspects of the North Atlantic experience of secularity have become globalized, shaping legal systems and other forms 
of collective governance around the world, local and regional histories and experiences often depart significantly from Taylor’s 
account of secularity and conception of religion. Scholars of religion and politics in the region need to consider those aspects 
of local and regional history, such as indigenous and Afro-descendent histories and experiences, that challenge or may be 
indifferent to globalized Euro-American experiences of secularity and religion. To do so requires grappling with the global 
effects of the history charted by Taylor while also moving beyond it to account for practices, histories, and ways of life that work 
outside or against “secularity 3” and the presumptions about religion that it presupposes and produces.
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Pensar la religión, el derecho y la política en América Latina
resumen
La era secular de Charles Taylor es a un mismo tiempo importante e insuficiente para el estudio de la religión, el derecho y la 
política en América Latina. Si bien hay aspectos de la experiencia del Atlántico Norte que se han globalizado, dando forma a 
sistemas jurídicos y otras formas de gobernanza política alrededor del mundo, las historias y experiencias locales y regionales 
suelen distar significativamente de la explicación de la secularidad y la concepción de la religión de Taylor. Los estudios 
académicos sobre religión y la política en la región necesitan tomar en consideración aquellos aspectos de la historia local 
y regional, tales como las historias y experiencias indígenas y afro-descendientes, que desafían o pueden ser indiferentes 
para las experiencias de secularidad y religión euro-americanas y globalizadas. Hacer esto requiere forcejear con los efectos 
globales de la historia establecidos por Taylor y avanzar al mismo tiempo más allá de ellos para dar cuenta de las prácticas, 
historias, y formas de vida que operan por fuera o en contra de la “secularidad 3”, y las presunciones sobre la religión que 
aquella presupone y produce.
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of law from conversations about power, history, difference, 
and governance.The same may be said of secularism. 
Following a raft of scholarship on secularism and secularity, 
it is now unsustainable to claim that a clean break has been 
achieved, anywhere, between secular law and politics 
on the one hand, and religion on the other. It is now a 
commonplace for scholars to begin with the assumption 
that, as Nandini Chatterjee (2010, 537) explains, “state 
secularism does not imply the withdrawal of the state from 
religious matters, but on the contrary it consists of the state 
assuming the role of the ultimate regulator of religious 
affiliations and arbiter of religious claims.” Contemporary 
practices of religious governance may not be as far 
removed from the early modern European settlements as 
secularization theory would suggest.2 Scholars working 
in different national contexts have shown rather that 
claims to secularism cannot be disentangled from specific 
histories, laws, and the construal and management of 
religion as a matter of difference and governance. Inquiry 
entire philosophy and practice sufficient for the peaceful coexistence 
of men on earth: universal law as the successor, one might say, to 
universal religion. This is a somewhat startling image for those of 
us who are lawyers —or who study law— and find it as violent, as 
historically messy, and as genealogically compromised as any other 
human institution. Yet the rule of law as the very essence of the 
secular, the a-cultural, the a-political, continues to operate in many 
places as a stand-in for the last best hope of mankind” (2010, 107).
2 Rather than privatizing religion, the early modern settlements 
inaugurated a new mode of managing it by territorializing religion 
in separate confessional states, as José Casanova explains: “In the 
early absolutist phase every state and church in Europe tried to 
reproduce the model of Christendom according to the principle cuius 
regio eius religio, which de facto meant that all the territorial national 
churches fell under the caesaro-papist control of the absolutist state” 
(Casanova 2001, 424-428).
Pensar a religião, o direito e a política na América Latina
resumo
A era secular, de Charles Taylor, é ao mesmo tempo importante e insuficiente para o estudo da religião, do direito e da 
política na América Latina. Embora haja aspectos da experiência do Atlântico Norte que têm sido globalizados, dando forma 
a sistemas jurídicos e outras formas de governança política ao redor do mundo, as histórias e experiências locais e regionais 
costumam estar distanciadas da explicação da secularidade e da concepção da religião de Taylor. Os estudos acadêmicos 
sobre religião e política na região precisam considerar aqueles aspectos da história local e regional, tais como as histórias e 
experiências indígenas e afrodescendentes, que desafiam ou podem ser indiferentes para as experiências de secularidade e 
religião euro-americanas e globalizadas. Fazer isso requer forcejar com os efeitos globais da história estabelecidos por Taylor 
e avançar ao mesmo tempo para mais além deles para dar conta das práticas, histórias e formas de vida que operam por fora 
ou contra a “secularidade 3”, e as presunções sobre a religião que aquela pressupõe e produz.
PaLaVras-chaVe
Secularismo, religião, lei, América Latina, Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, Charles Taylor.
Modernity in the south is not adequately understood as a deriva-
tive or a doppelganger, a callow copy or a counterfeit, of the Euro-
American ‘original.’ To the contrary: it demands to be apprehended 
and addressed in its own right.
(Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff 2013)
Introduction
i
n an essay on equality and citizenship in a multi-
religious Sudan, Noah Salomon describes the 
commitment of international development experts 
to equality before the law as a non-ideological 
solution to the problems plaguing post-conflict 
societies. Salomon cites Thomas Carothers of the 
Carnegie Endowment as an example of the consensus 
that if the law is procedurally sound, it will serve as an 
apolitical, technical solution that is distinct from rule by 
force. Interestingly, Salomon disagrees with Carothers, 
suggesting that “law, the institutions which promote it, 
and our relationship to them enfold deep ideological and 
political commitments which require a whole host of 
presumptions about justice and how best to achieve it” 
(Salomon 2011, 201). While the international rule of law is 
often assumed to govern from a neutral public space that 
has transcended ideological and political particularities, 
the hegemony of the rule of law discourse is not itself a 
mark of neutrality.1 It would be a mistake to remove the rule 
1 Winnifred Sullivan expands on this point: “the desirability of 
global extension of the rule of law is currently being promoted by 
political actors across the ideological spectrum. At times, rhetorical 
evocation of the rule of law takes on a transcendent glow —as of an 
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into different modes of governing religion by state 
institutions and the broader socio-legal contexts that 
sustain and subvert them —many of which have been 
described as secular— has led to what Nilüfer Göle (2010, 
43) describes as “an unpacking of secularity as a religion-
free, neutral, and universal development of European 
modernity.” My work on the politics of secularism in 
international relations was part of this effort to de-center 
the universal pretensions of claims to secular governance 
(Hurd 2008a). Nonetheless, even as this approach has taken 
hold to varying degrees across disciplines, its implications 
for Latin America have yet to be fully explored.
This article considers, in two steps, how such a 
research program might be conceived. It begins with 
an introduction to Charles Taylor’s account of the 
emergence of exclusive humanism in Europe in A 
Secular Age. Taylor steps outside of the familiar self-
presentation of secularism as a form of governance that 
emerges naturally once religion has been privatized, 
marginalized or superseded. As Bonnie Honig observes, 
and as Taylor shows, “the universal is never really as we 
imagine it: truly unconditional, context-transcending, 
and unmarked by particularity and politics” (Honig 
2006, 116). Claims to the secular are contingent and 
context-bound, and marked by particularity and politics, 
in Europe as elsewhere.3 Provincializing North Atlantic 
moral order as Taylor does suggests that the experience 
of what he describes as a “closed spin” on the immanent 
frame does not signal the achievement of secular legal 
or political neutrality “after” religion. It is, rather, a 
specific historical and cultural formation emerging from 
European Christendom that was, to varying degrees, 
imposed, transformed, ignored and rejected in other 
parts of the world.
Taylor’s account is both important and insufficient to 
the study of the intersection of religion, law, and politics 
in Latin America. It is important because through 
colonialism and globalization, aspects of the North 
Atlantic experience of secularity have shaped political 
and religious lives, subjectivities, and forms of collective 
3 There is a vast literature on this subject. Markus Dressler and 
Arvind Mandair have described three trajectories in the critique of 
secularity: “(i) the socio-political philosophy of liberal secularism 
exemplified by Charles Taylor (and to some extent shared by thinkers 
such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas); (ii) the ‘postmodernist’ 
critiques of onto-theological metaphysics by radical theologians and 
continental philosophers that have helped to revive the discourse of 
‘political theology’; (iii) following the work of Michel Foucault and 
Edward Said, the various forms of discourse analysis focusing on 
genealogies of power most closely identified with the work of Talal 
Asad” (Dressler and Mandair 2011, 4).
governance all over the world, including Latin America. 
It is insufficient in that Latin American histories and 
experiences —in fact, all histories and experiences— also 
depart in significant ways from Taylor’s phenomenology 
of western secularity. As Cécile Laborde has observed, 
“the concept [religion] may well have been forged in 
the crucible of missionary and colonial encounters, 
but its meanings and uses have further proliferated in 
non-colonial and post-colonial settings, in ways that 
escaped, distorted, and subverted the original discourse” 
(Laborde 2014). It is incumbent on scholars to account 
for the effects of the legal and political globalization 
of the North Atlantic history and experience described 
by Taylor while also creating spaces for local, regional, 
and global processes and histories that work outside of 
or may be indifferent to its terms and presumptions. I 
return to this below.Scholars of religion and politics in 
Latin America should also resist appropriating secularism 
or secularity as descriptive categories, inquiring into 
whether and to what degree states and societies are 
secularist, religious, undergoing de-secularization, or 
becoming post-secular. This limits the kinds of questions 
that can be asked. As John Bowen explains, “when 
scholars do try to analyze the issues in terms of the very 
terms of debate, they usually do so as part of their efforts 
to advance particular policy positions: for or against school 
prayer, headscarves, or faith-based charities. Precisely 
because the historical trajectories producing current 
regimes also produced their ideologies, prominent ways 
of speaking about state and religion cannot serve as 
bases for analyzing state and religion” (Bowen 2010, 
688).4 To move beyond the limitations of adopting as 
foundational the very terms that need to be subjected to 
critical and contextual analysis requires asking a different 
set of questions. It requires, as Dressler and Mandair have 
suggested, releasing “the space of the political from the 
grasp of the secularization doctrine” (Dressler and Mandair 
2011, 18).What this entails in practical terms, in Latin 
America or elsewhere, is one of the most interesting and 
vexing challenges facing scholars of religion and politics 
today. Various possibilities have been proposed. One 
is to open the field of inquiry onto a broader social and 
4 Bowen continues: “If all we knew were the supposedly general 
properties and features of “the secular,” we would be able to 
understand very little about how the French governance regime came 
to be what it is today. Nor, mutatis mutandis, would we be any closer 
to understanding any other country’s particular set of historical 
processes and modes of governance, including the United States, 
where the configurations of Catholic immigrants and Protestant 
traditions of schooling, for example, produced a specific set of 
tensions focused on Bible reading and individual prayer that do not 
play as prominent a role elsewhere.”
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interpretive field of religion, law, and other collective 
tools of governance (Hurd 2014). Such an approach 
would not inquire into the definitions of secularism or 
religion, comparative typologies of secularism, or how 
religion has been or should be related to secular law and 
politics —implicitly, whether religion or some proxy 
for it should be accommodated legally, and if so, how 
and with what justification. It would instead focus on 
how histories and processes such as the globalization of 
European secularity have shaped local modes of collective 
governance while at the same time considering aspects of 
local and regional experience such as, in the case of Latin 
America, the role of indigenous and Afro-descendent 
religions that may challenge, be indifferent to, or work 
outside of Euro-American histories and experiences. 
Such an approach would toggle back and forth between 
the local and the transnational, neither assigning 
totalizing, transformative power to external agents and 
forms of knowledge nor reducing local or indigenous 
agency and ways of life to “callow copies or counterfeits” 
or derivatives of allegedly more robust Euro-American 
“originals.” This returns us to the Comaroffs’ remark 
cited in the epigraph above and requires a different 
approach to religion, as discussed below.Much has 
been written about A Secular Age. My intention in what 
follows is to give a brief synopsis of Taylor’s contribution 
to provincializing European secularity. The idea is to 
incorporate an awareness of the global impact of the North 
Atlantic history that Taylor charts, while remaining 
alert to the local and regional processes and histories 
that work outside of or against the terms of “secularity 
3” and the presumptions about religion that it enfolds. 
The predicament of the K’iche’ people of Guatemala, 
discussed below, is one example. There are many others.
Provincializing European Secularity
For Taylor, life in a secular age means that many 
individuals in the West find themselves in some version 
of what he describes as the “immanent frame,” a social 
space and way of being in the world in which time is 
secular, instrumental rationality is a key value, and a 
supernatural or transcendent order is felt by many to 
be a fading, implausible, and embattled alterative in 
a world dominated by a particular understanding of 
immanence. Borrowing from Wittgenstein, Taylor sets 
out to explain how this frame came to “hold us captive” 
as modern subjects, showing that particular conditions 
of belief and unbelief emerged out of European social and 
religious history and experience. It is this gradual, and 
in Taylor’s view inexorable, process that is chronicled 
in A Secular Age. In explaining how it became possible 
for many Europeans and their religious and cultural 
descendants “to experience moral fullness, to identify 
the locus of our highest moral capacity and inspiration, 
without reference to God, but within the range of purely 
intra-human powers,”5 Taylor offers a rich history of the 
background conditions against which claims to have 
“outgrown” religion came to seem natural and normal 
to many Europeans, and, ultimately, to many others as 
well. It is a context in which, in Taylor’s accounting, 
moral and spiritual resources are felt to be purely 
immanent, meaning that they make no reference to 
“something higher which humans should reverence or 
love or acknowledge” (Taylor 2007, 244-245). Once myth 
and error are dissipated, in this view, an empirical-
scientific approach to knowledge claims, individualism, 
negative freedom, and instrumental rationality are 
positioned to become dominant. As Taylor describes it, 
“the empirical approach is the only way of acquiring 
knowledge, and this becomes evident as soon as we free 
ourselves from the thraldom of a false metaphysics… 
individualism is the normal fruit of human self-regard 
absent the illusory claims of God, the Chain of Being, or 
the sacred order of society” (Taylor 2007, 571).
Taylor proposes an alternative to such “subtraction 
stories” of modernity, in which superstition and belief 
are understood to have withered on the vine, opening 
the way for modern science and humanism to flourish 
uninhibited by metaphysical constraints. He argues 
that subtraction stories read out of the picture the 
possibility that Western modernity is itself powered 
by a novel form of moral self-understanding which 
represents one vision of the good among others, rather 
than the only viable set left after the old myths and 
legends have been exploded (Taylor 2007, 571). A Secular 
Age is a phenomenology of the creation and discovery 
of these new moral sources and the emergence of 
“secularity 3,” a modern context of understanding in 
which belief and unbelief coexist uneasily, in which 
one believes or refuses to believe in God, a “cross-
pressured” condition in which according to Taylor, 
“our experience of and search for fullness occurs” 
(Taylor 2007, 19). Secularity 3 is distinguished from the 
5 Taylor (2007, 244-245). Taylor cites two preconditions for the emergence 
of exclusive humanism: the fading of the enchanted world, and 
the development of a conception of our highest spiritual and moral 
aspirations “such that we could conceive of doing without God in 
acknowledging and pursing them,” which he attributes to an ethic 
of imposed order which “made it seem possible to rely exclusively on 
intra-human powers to carry it through.” The result, and the key to 
the emergence of the immanent frame, is that “the points at which 
God seemed an indispensable source for this ordering power were 
the ones which began to fade and become invisible. The hitherto 
unthought became thinkable” (2007, 234).
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retreat of religion in public life (“secularity 1”) and the 
falling off of individual religious belief and practice 
(“secularity 2”).Diverging from conventional as well as 
from more critical accounts of secularization, A Secular 
Age advances a third position which emphasizes the 
intimacies between Western experiences of secularity 
and Christianity while defending the emergence of 
exclusive humanism as “a novel form of moral self-
understanding, not definable simply by the negation 
of what preceded it” (Taylor 2007, 571). The hallmark 
of this new humanism is its attempt to “immanentize” 
the capacity of benevolence, thus retaining the “agapê-
analogue,” or the recognition that the power to create a 
modern order of mutual benefit resides in all and each of 
us” (Taylor 2007, 247-248). In this account, the “secular” 
is a slippery term in a shifting secular/other dyad that, 
just as it seems to have gained a cultural foothold, 
undergoes another transformation. Initially referring 
to two dimensions of existence identified by the kind of 
time essential to each (secular or sacred), this internal 
dyad mutated into quite another, in which the secular 
served as an anchor referring to that pertaining to a 
self-sufficient immanent sphere, as contrasted with a 
“religious” transcendent realm. From the 17th century 
onwards, another crucial transformation occurred with 
a denial of this transcendent level and the emergence of 
an external dyad in which the secular is denominated as 
“real” and the religious or transcendent is denominated 
as “invented.” The secular, at that moment, refers to 
those institutions required to live in this world, while the 
religious refers to a series of optional extras that are seen 
by many as thwarting progress in this world. The secular 
becomes “all there is.” This third moment is closed to 
transcendence, or more accurately, to Taylor’s conception 
of radical transcendence. This is what he refers to as 
the “declaration of independence” of the immanent. 
This particular “spin” toward closure, or belief in a 
purely self-sufficing humanism, is Taylor’s attempt to 
explain and parochialize “the sensed context in which 
we develop our beliefs,” which “has usually sunk to the 
level of such an unchallenged framework, something we 
have trouble often thinking ourselves outside of, even as 
an imaginative exercise” (Taylor 2007, 549-550). In this 
account, particular transformations in the European 
social imaginary led to the possibility of the emergence 
of a self-sufficient immanent sphere that could represent 
itself as standing apart from, and, for many, sloughing 
off its transcendent counterpart entirely. Immanence 
and transcendence are understood and experienced (this 
goes beyond cognition) in a particular fashion, if only, 
in many instances, to renounce the possibility of radical 
transcendence altogether.
Understanding these transformations as one set of 
possibilities among others —provincializing the history 
of this particular experience of North Atlantic moral 
order —helps us to situate the “immanent frame” 
in a particular European, and then global, history.6 
This is important for a region such as Latin America in 
which this history has played a formative role through 
colonialism, Christian missions, and other historical 
processes. Yet Taylor’s account also remains tethered to 
very particular understandings of European religious 
history and experience, and indebted to it in complex 
ways (Hurd 2008b), that may ultimately limit our field of 
vision in thinking about the study of religion and politics 
in this region. Kristina Stoeckl (2014) refers to this in a 
piece on The Immanent Frame in which she observes 
that Taylor, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas are all 
“steeped in specific traditions of theological (or religious 
philosophical) thought” which, though not surprising or 
even necessarily problematic, remain “mostly implicit in 
their political theoretical ‘operationalization’ of religion.” 
To take the next step beyond Taylor’s phenomenology 
of Western secular history and experience requires 
contemplating the limits of his “operationalization” 
of religion by, among other things, accounting for 
histories and experiences that push against, work 
outside of, or may be entirely indifferent to “secularity 
3” and the conceptions of religion that it presupposes 
and produces. This opens up spaces for work on religion, 
law, and governance that would otherwise be foreclosed 
on in accounts that remain wedded to the categories 
of religious and secular experience and traditions of 
religious philosophical thought privileged by Taylor and 
many of his interlocutors.
There are a number of different ways in which to pursue 
this research agenda. One is to explore the gap between 
religion as construed for reasons of power —including 
the law— and a broader field of religious practices of 
6 A history that is neither Christian nor post-Christian. The term 
“post-Christian” raises interesting questions. Former Archbishop of 
Canterbury Rowan Williams made some interesting observations on 
the subject recently in reference to the UK: “If I say that this is a post-
Christian nation, that doesn’t mean necessarily non-Christian. It 
means the cultural memory is still quite strongly Christian. And in 
some ways, the cultural presence is still quite strongly Christian. But 
it is post-Christian in the sense that habitual practice for most of the 
population is not taken for granted.” Andrew Sparrow reports that 
when pressed for a yes/no response to the question about whether 
Britain was a Christian country, Williams replied: “A Christian 
country as a nation of believers? No. A Christian country in the sense 
of still being very much saturated by this vision of the world and 
shaped by it? Yes” (Sparrow 2014).
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individuals and communities on the ground.7 The next 
section takes up this possibility by contrasting the legal 
construction of religion at the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR) with the experiences of the K’iche’ 
people of Guatemala.Legal Religion in Latin America
The institutionalization of particular conceptions of 
religion in regional and international legal instruments 
creates a gap between the forms of religion protected in 
law and the religious practices of ordinary people. While 
this is not unique to Latin America, it is particularly visible 
there in the case of indigenous and Afro-descendent 
religions, which are less likely to qualify as eligible 
for protection under legal regimes that privilege an 
understanding of religion in which Christianity or other 
monotheistic traditions are taken as normative. To see 
these dynamics requires accounting for both the socio-legal 
force of particular understandings of religion (in Martti 
Koskienniemi’s words, “What hierarchies and distributive 
choices are involved? Who is supposed to be competent to 
represent the universal?”),8 while also accounting for local 
and regional histories that reject, work outside of, or may 
be indifferent to them. This section explores the potential 
of this two-step approach, beginning with the example of 
a legal case originating in Chile and involving a conflict 
between freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
staged within the terms of majoritarian understandings of 
religion, before moving to a conflict in Guatemala staged 
outside of those confines. In the process, it seeks to explore 
the gap between the understanding of religion as belief 
or conscience reflected in the religion jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and a more 
diverse and multiform field of local histories, practices, 
and modes of collective being and belonging.
7 This approach to the study of religion, law, and politics is developed 
further in Hurd (2015).
8 “Law’s power and attraction lie in its offering what appears a universal 
point of view, its ability to raise mere opinions onto a status of what 
is (universally) right… And yet this universal standpoint constantly 
eludes us. Rules show themselves as mere interpretations, principles 
are challenged by equally powerful counter principles, etc. Even as 
claims about the law of force clash… such claims are nevertheless 
united in their claiming a universal standpoint. Or to put this in 
another way, by recourse to law, the contestants agree that only a 
universal standpoint provides an acceptable basis for the exercise 
of institutional power (in this case, the use of force) and thus the 
appropriate standards from which to hold it accountable. This 
particularity of the law… might have led Brunnée and Toope, to 
examine what different types of ‘universal’ are being invoked in the 
arguments concerning the use of force today. What hierarchies and 
distributive choices are involved? Who is supposed to be competent to 
represent the universal? Behind the conventional law on the use of 
force, there is a whole world order, a system of empowering some and 
disempowering other institutions and dividing resources between 
human groups” (Koskienniemi 2011, 324).
In 2001, the IACHR, based in San José, Costa Rica, 
heard a religious censorship case brought by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights against the 
state of Chile (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
2001).9 The case involved a challenge to the refusal of 
the Chilean Cinematographic Classification Council 
(CCC) to allow the exhibition of the Martin Scorsese 
film “The Last Temptation of Christ.” The film portrays 
the story of Jesus but also, as Gomes explains, “departs 
significantly from the rendition of the Gospels” in 
portraying Jesus as an ordinary human struggling 
with guilt and sexual temptation (Gomes 2009, 599). 
The CCC had originally authorized the exhibition of 
the Last Temptation film for “mature audiences” only 
(defined as viewers over age 18) in November 1996. 
A year later, the Santiago Court of Appeals annulled 
that decision in response to a remedy for protection 
filed by seven plaintiffs who alleged that the film was 
offensive to the figure of Jesus Christ, the Catholic 
Church, and themselves. In 1997 the Chilean Supreme 
Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision to censor 
the film on the grounds that it presented a “deformed 
and abused” image of Jesus Christ that endangered the 
nation by disregarding “the values on which it is based” 
(IACHR 2001, 30). At this point, a new set of plaintiffs 
accused the Chilean government of having violated 
their right to freedom of religion and expression in 
censoring the exhibition of the film. When their case 
was brought before the Inter-American Commission, 
the Commission recommended that the Chilean 
government suspend censorship of the film and adopt 
internal legislation to guarantee the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedom guaranteed by the Convention, 
observing that the censorship was incompatible with 
the norms of the IACHR and violated Art. 12 (freedom of 
religion) and Art. 13 (freedom of expression or thought) 
of the Convention.10 The Chilean Government refused to 
accept the Commission’s recommendation, and so the 
Commission brought the case to the IACHR in San José 
to decide whether there had been violations of Articles 
12 or 13 of the American Convention. In 2001, the IACHR 
ruled that Chile had violated the right to freedom of 
expression and thought embodied in Art. 13, concluding 
that “state interference affected those who have beliefs 
related to the religious content of the film ‘The Last 
Temptation of Christ,’ because they are prevented from 
9 See Alter 2014 on the scope and powers of international courts such as 
the IACHR and the implications of this emergent international judicial 
architecture for domestic politics and international relations.
10 On the specific demands made by the Commission in Report No. 
69/98 see Gomes (2009, 575).
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exercising the right to freedom of conscience by not 
being able to see the film and form their own opinion 
about the ideas expressed in it. Moreover, it affects 
those who belong to other creeds or who do not have 
religious convictions, because one creed is privileged 
in prejudice to the free access to information of other 
persons, who have the right to access to and form their 
own opinion about the work” (IACHR 2001, 28). The 
Court declared, however, that Chile had not violated the 
right to freedom of conscience and religion embodied 
in Article 12 because “the prohibition of the exhibition 
of the film did not impair or deprive anyone of their 
right to maintain, change, profess or disseminate 
their religion or beliefs with total freedom.” The Court 
pressured the Chilean government to reform domestic 
laws regarding freedom of thought and expression, 
and in 2003 it declared the Chilean government in full 
compliance with the judgment.
The Last Temptation controversy unfolded within and 
reproduced particular understandings of freedom of 
conscience, religion, and expression that would be familiar 
to anyone following the recent religion jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights. According to Benedetto 
Conforti, the San José judges were directly influenced 
in their decision by the European Court’s freedom of 
expression jurisprudence (Conforti 2002, 283). The Last 
Temptation controversy may be situated within a broader 
context of understanding in which particular experiences 
of belief and unbelief serve as the baseline for defining and 
legally protecting freedom of religion. In this sense, one 
could speak of the globalization of a Taylorian political and 
legal secularity and sensibility.
It is not, however, shared universally. Consider 
the experience of the K’iche’ people of Guatemala, 
represented by the K’iche’ People’s Council, who in recent 
years have been subjected to the consequences of ongoing 
collusion between multinational mining corporations, 
the police, and the Guatemalan state, which has led to 
discrimination and violence against them, including 
massive violations of their cultural heritage and land 
rights. Journalist and advocate Dianne Post describes 
their predicament:
In one Mayan area, the K’iche’ People’s Council is 
led by Lolita Chávez Ixcaquic, who is also protected 
by precautionary measures because of an attempted 
assassination. The council represents 87 Mayan 
communities that, in a very democratic process, 
unanimously rejected mining and hydroelectric 
projects. The foreign commercial companies have 
offered to pay them a higher percent of profits, failing 
completely to understand that the reason these projects 
were rejected is not monetary, but is linked to the 
refusal to allow destruction of the earth for religious and 
cultural reasons. (Post 2013)
The K’iche’ are a Mayan group living in the western 
highlands of Guatemala. Rigoberta Menchú, who 
won the Nobel Peace Price in 1992 for her activism on 
behalf of indigenous peoples, is perhaps the most 
well known K’iche’. As scholars of indigenous religion 
have pointed out in other contexts (Johnson 2007; 
Wenger 2009), K’iche’ attachment to the land does not 
register legally as religious, thus making it difficult or 
impossible for the K’iche’ to avail themselves of national 
or international legal protections for religion, religious 
rights, or religious freedom. Their claims are invisible 
to organizations, actors and legal instruments focused 
on the legal realization of religious freedom, because, 
in some important sense, they are perceived as having 
no (recognizable) religion. Cast in terms of religion 
understood as the right to believe or not believe, along 
the lines of Arts. 12 and 13 of the American Convention, 
violations of K’iche’ religious-cultural heritage are 
inaudible before the IACHR and Guatemalan authorities. 
The same holds true for the U.S. State Department. The 
2012 State Department International Religious Freedom 
Report for Guatemala observes that there were “no 
reports of abuses of religious freedom” in the country. 
This non-recognition policy unfolds in spite of the fact 
that the K’iche’ have been associated with the most 
studied indigenous document of Mesoamerica, the 
Popol Vuh, described by Néstor Quiroa as “a mythical-
historical narrative that recounts the creation of the 
universe, followed by the creation of the K’iche’ people 
of highland Guatemala and the legendary history of 
the K’iche’ dynasties up to the arrival of the Spanish 
in 1524” (Quiroa 2011, 468). Quiroa shows that the 
Popol Vuh as we know it today is itself “the product 
of a colonial encounter between Maya and European 
civilization” (Quiroa 2011, 472), and he concludes that Fr. 
Francisco Ximénez’s treatise should be understood as “an 
expression of the Dominican evangelization campaign 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century—a tool 
intended to destroy native religion in order to replace it 
with European Christianity” (Quiroa 2011, 479).
Recognition of the significance of the Popol Vuh and 
K’iche’ claims to the land as authentically “religious” 
might, in the short term, allow the K’iche’ to declare 
themselves a persecuted minority, avail themselves of 
the law, and address some of the problems attending 
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their alleged misrecognition. Yet regardless of how 
religion is defined and “managed,” relying on the 
category of religion in law means that some groups will 
be disadvantaged and others privileged. Protections 
for religions and religious rights guaranteed in 
law are always partial, reflecting and privileging 
majoritarian conceptions of religion and majoritarian 
understandings of rights. In this case, matters are 
further complicated by the fact that the most influential 
factor in this controversy is not the law but a range of 
powerful interests that have stacked the deck against 
the K’iche’ People’s Council in favor of neoliberal actors 
and constituencies that benefit economically from 
opening the Guatemalan state to transnational capital.
The predicament of the K’iche’ People’s Council suggests 
that scholars of religion and politics in Latin America 
would do well to see beyond the legal and political 
construal of religion by those in power, including the 
law, the Guatemalan state, the IACHR and the U.S. State 
Department, to account for a broader field of sociabilities 
and historical practice. This would involve, among other 
steps, attempting to understand indigenous practices and 
histories on their own terms, even, or especially to the 
extent that they appear unintelligible or illegible to Euro-
American legal and normative conceptions of secularity 
and religion. This would shift our attention away from 
a focus on separation versus accommodation, freedom 
versus public order, and religion as the right to believe or 
not believe, on display in the Last Temptation controversy. 
It would resist the pressure for normative closure that 
often nips at the heels of these legal controversies. Most 
importantly, it would allow us to see that although the 
K’iche’ can legally believe whatever they choose—they 
may enjoy “religious freedom” under some legal definition 
or another —they cannot keep the mining companies off 
their (sacred) lands. It is important to document these 
limitations of contemporary legal attempts to guarantee 
religious freedom at a moment in which protections for 
(always particular) understandings of religious freedom 
are gaining traction not only in national and comparative 
constitutional debates but internationally as well (Hurd 
2015). Among other consequences, a commitment 
to these goods and goals diverts scarce resources and 
directs international attention away from the needs and 
demands of indigenous and immigrant communities in 
Latin America and elsewhere.
That these dynamics are not unique to Latin 
America is suggestive of the comparative and cross-
regional potential of this research agenda. Tensions 
between “official,” “governed” or “legal” religion and 
unsanctioned, multiform “lived” religiosities (Hurd 
2015) are also evident in China, where the government 
has four categories of religious groups: officially 
sanctioned religions, unregistered groups, “cults,” and 
“feudal superstitions.” Officially recognized religions 
include Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and 
Protestantism. A government-controlled religious 
association oversees each of these official religions as 
prescribed in the 2005 Religious Affairs Regulations, 
yet only about 140 million of the more than 200 million 
religious adherents in China belong to registered 
religious groups (Carlson 2005, 771).11
No rights or protections are accorded to those falling into 
one or more of the other three categories, which include 
unregistered groups, cults, and feudal superstitions. 
Like the K’iche’ in Guatemala, “millions of others 
ascribe to folk religious practices not neatly categorized 
into traditional Western notions of religion” (Dean, 
cited in Carlson 2005, 772-773). Before 2005, according 
to Eric Carlson, “folk religious practices”—or everything 
that failed to conform to the government’s categories 
of official religion— could exist in a kind of “no-man’s 
land,” operating with the tacit consent of local officials 
(Carlson 2005, 772). The new 2005 regulations, however, 
eliminated these gray areas, making it more difficult 
for the State Administration for Religious Affairs to 
accommodate groups failing to meet the criteria for 
government registration. This intensification of state 
oversight meant that new legal tools to crack down on 
dissidents deemed to be in violation of the regulations 
became available to national, provincial, and local 
officials. “Folk” or other forms of religious practice were 
classified as unorthodox and subjected to heightened 
state regulation and suppression. As Carlson concludes, 
“if the new regulations (and the constitution) protect 
only ‘normal’ religious activity, then the definition 
of ‘normal’ is critical” (Carlson 2005, 772, 767). 
Interestingly, particularly in light of Guatemala’s alleged 
lack of religious freedom violations, Chinese authorities 
were quick to claim that the 2005 Regulations complied 
with international standards on the right to religious 
freedom. In a speech at the issuance of the regulations, 
the president of the Daoist Association of China, Zhang 
Jiyu, assured his audience that the regulations would 
bring domestic laws into conformity with international 
11 Examples of unregistered religions include the underground Catholic 
Church, Falun Gong, Zhong Gong, worshipers of the Dragon King or 
God of Fortune, Hinduism, Judaism, various Orthodox churches, 
a variety of Christian sects, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
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norms on religion and human rights, stating that, “the 
religious freedom described in the regulations is exactly 
in line with the spirit of the United Nations’ human 
rights convention” (Cited in Carlson 2005, 747).
Normative Diversity, Law, and 
Governance
The instability of the category of religion as it relates 
to law and other tools of collective governance, and the 
myriad entanglements between secular law and other 
normative systems, have received considerable scholarly 
attention in recent years (Sullivan, Yelle and Taussig-
Rubbo 2011). More than a decade ago, law and religion 
scholar Winnifred Sullivan observed that, “‘religion’ 
cannot be understood apart from an understanding of 
the cluster of ideas around the invention and regulation 
of modern religion, including religious freedom, 
disestablishment, and the separation of church and 
state…” (2003,173). Citing Michael Rosenfeld, Sullivan 
has suggested that “the ‘return’ of religion takes place 
in a space structured and conditioned by law —secular 
law, the ‘rule of law,’ a law that enjoys an unprecedented 
hegemony. The vaunted ‘freedom’ of religion is bounded, 
and in a very particular way” (2007, 153-154). Hussein 
Agrama has explored the Egyptian state’s authority to 
define the spaces and sensibilities that are appropriate 
to religion, suggesting that this authority is often vested 
in courts, codes, constitutions and judicial authority 
(Agrama 2010, 504). Malika Zeghal (2008) has charted 
the Moroccan state’s efforts to shape Moroccan Islam 
through the agency of the monarchy’s control of state 
legal, political, social and economic institutions. John 
Comaroff has described law’s rising global salience 
“as ideology, as species of practice, as utopic cure-all, 
as landscape of political struggle, as instrument of 
governmentality” (Comaroff 2010, 194).
An emerging body of scholarship at the intersection of 
the study of law, religion, and politics is distinguished 
by its approach to religion as part of an evolving, 
shifting series of broader fields of contemporary and 
historical practice, rather than as a factor that can be 
singled out from or reduced to other aspects of human 
activity. Religion is interwoven with and participates 
in broader fields of historical, institutional, political, 
economic, and social practice. It is impossible to adopt 
a singular, trans-historical and transcultural conception 
of religion given the vast, diverse, and shifting array 
of practices and histories that fall under the heading 
of religion as the term is used today. To define groups 
politically as “religious” actors based on the assumption 
that something called religion motivates their actions is 
a questionable move. As C. S. Adcock has shown in her 
work on India, and as I have suggested with respect to the 
K’iche’ of Guatemala in this article, we need to consider 
“what is foregrounded when we speak of religion and 
what forms of politics our talk of religion might exclude” 
(Adcock 2012).12 Working out how to define what religion 
means for law, as Julian Rivers suggests, “is inevitably, 
in part, an evaluative process in which the law defines 
‘religion’ for the relevant purposes” (Rivers 2010, vii). 
Every attempt to legally distinguish between religion 
and non-religion, believers and non-believers, relies on 
assumptions about what counts as religion and what 
does not. Every attempt to protect religion as belief or 
unbelief requires discriminating between that which 
counts as religious belief as opposed to other forms of 
belief or mere opinions (Asad 2012; Sherwood 2015).13 As 
Pamela Slotte explains, “when something is denoted 
‘religion’ or ‘religious,’ certain things are ascribed to it 
and it is ascribed a place in society” (Slotte 2010, 3).
And yet, many scholars and practitioners, particularly 
in the social sciences and policy circles, cling intuitively 
to a fixed and stable notion of religion as a private set 
of interiorized beliefs and values independently chosen 
by individuals, and then enacted. Sullivan describes 
this as “a stripped-down understanding of religion 
that finds its origin in Protestant and Enlightenment 
theories of the state and of religion —one that sees 
religion’s role as one of teaching virtue to its citizens 
through the training of private consciences— and which 
often simply refuses to acknowledge cultural aspects 
of religious life” (Sullivan 1999). It is the religion of a 
particular version of modern liberalism. A shift in focus 
away from secularism and secularization as orienting 
constructs and toward a broader field of interactions 
between modern religiosities and projects of collective 
12 Adcock (2012) has observed that scholars of India have often taken 
recourse to a “religious” vocabulary to describe vernacular idioms of 
politics that are outside the civic arena, thereby obscuring “the labor 
of translation that was required when Indian actors represented their 
political struggles before the state.” This move renders invisible the 
politics of caste, while emphasizing a politics of religious difference 
focused on the right (or not) to proselytize, heightening tensions 
surrounding the politics of religious conversion.
13 “The difficulty is this: What are to count as religious beliefs? Should 
beliefs denounced by the medieval Latin church as superstitio 
(wrongheadedness) therefore be regarded as secular beliefs? Or 
should they be pronounced religious on the criteria provided by late-
Enlightenment critics for whom all religion was superstition? Is the 
intention to carry out a particular act always crucial to its religiosity? 
If so, how and by whom is that to be judged?” Asad (2012, 46).
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governance will help to parochialize the still-
powerful conception of religion as “private, voluntary, 
individual, textual, and believed” that underlies many 
academic discussions, drawing attention instead to 
the “religion of most of the world,” which is public, 
oral, enacted, and communal (Sullivan 2007, 8). This 
approach to religion, law, and politics would open 
spaces in which to explore life worlds that are situated 
outside, at the margins of, or beyond the terms and 
understandings inherited —and at times imposed— by 
those immersed in one “spin” or another of Taylor’s 
immanent frame. It would take as a point of departure 
the cultural peculiarities and historical contingencies 
of legal subjectivities that are indebted to the North 
Atlantic understandings of religion, secularity, and 
subjectivity described by Taylor. It would highlight 
the gap between religion as construed by the church, 
state, or court for reasons of power, and religion as 
lived and experienced by individuals and groups with 
complex and changing relations to the institutions and 
hierarchies that allegedly represent them, from which 
they have fallen away, or to which they never fully 
subscribed (Hurd 2015).
In the chapter mentioned in the introduction to this 
article, Noah Salomon describes the worldviews of the 
various groups that he encountered during his fieldwork 
in Sudan, including members of the government and 
allied Islamists (al-haraka al-islaamiyya, al-islaamiyuun), 
evangelist Salafis, and politically engaged Sufis. 
He explains that one of his objectives in describing 
their divergent worldviews is to make it possible to 
begin to “imagine a conversation about interreligious 
coexistence which does not rely on the liberal categories 
bequeathed by international human rights discourse… 
this is not a language of human rights (or even “the 
rights of non-Muslims”), but rather one in which the 
specificity of each religious category is recognized and 
engaged with in a manner appropriate to each kind” 
(Salomon 2011, 214). One challenge for scholars of 
religion and politics in Latin America, and elsewhere, 
is to develop frameworks that are open to the potential 
of such conversations. This involves reconsidering, 
without discarding, the assumptions about religion 
that underlie current legal and constitutional debates 
and inform international human rights advocacy. It 
involves resisting attempts to assimilate other ways of 
being and belonging —from the K’iche’ to the Sufis to 
practitioners of Chinese “folk” religion— into legal and 
normative frameworks indebted to particular, though 
powerful, European and American experiences of 
secularity and conceptions of religious freedom. ➻
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